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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Terry Klotz’s now-deceased husband received medical 
services from Hackensack University Medical Center (the 
“Hospital”) and incurred a $1,580 debt. Klotz’s husband did 
not pay the medical debt before he died, and he left no estate. 
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The Hospital retained Celentano, Stadtmauer and 
Walentowicz, LLP (“CSW”) to collect the debt, and it mailed 
two collection letters to Klotz.  
 
Klotz claims she is not liable for the debt and asks us to 
hold that the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), 15 
U.S.C. § 1691 et seq., preempts New Jersey’s common-law 
doctrine of necessaries (where a spouse is jointly liable for nec-
essary expenses incurred by the other spouse). Preemption of 
this doctrine would allow her to pursue a case against CSW for 
an alleged violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. We hold that the ECOA 
does not preempt New Jersey’s doctrine of necessaries. Klotz 
also argues that CSW failed to follow the procedural require-
ments of the doctrine of necessaries and that she should be 
allowed to amend her complaint. We reject these additional 




Klotz believed that she was not liable for the debt, so 
she sued CSW for violating 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f of 
the FDCPA because CSW’s collection letters sought payment 
of a debt that she did not owe. CSW moved to dismiss the com-
plaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing 
that Klotz owed the debt under New Jersey’s common-law 
doctrine of necessaries because her deceased husband incurred 
the debt for medical treatment. The District Court agreed with 
CSW and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Klotz 
moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) for recon-
sideration of the District Court’s order and for leave to file an 
amended complaint with additional allegations. The District 
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Court denied the motion, reasoning that amendment would be 




The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). We have appel-
late jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 
Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 
(3d Cir. 2014). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint 
must set forth enough factual allegations to “state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when 
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the mis-
conduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we accept as true all 
factual allegations in the complaint and view those facts in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Foglia, 754 F.3d 
at 154 n.1. 
 
We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 59(e) 
motion to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion, but we 
review the district court’s underlying legal determinations de 
novo and factual determinations for clear error. Burtch v. 
Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011). When 
a plaintiff moves to amend her complaint under Rule 59(e), we 
apply the same factors as when a party files a motion to amend 
a pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). See 
Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 864 (3d Cir. 1984). Those 
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factors include whether the amendment would be futile. 
Burtch, 662 F.3d at 231. A proposed amendment to a complaint 
is futile if the amended complaint would fail to state a claim 
for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). See Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 




The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from using false, 
misleading, and unfair debt-collection practices by seeking to 
collect on a debt that is not authorized by law. See 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f.  As noted, Klotz believes that she 
does not owe her husband’s medical debt. She argues that 
CSW’s debt-collection letters misrepresent “the character, 
amount, or legal status of [the] debt” in violation of the 
FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A).  
 
 In response, CSW argues that Klotz had a legal obliga-
tion to pay the debt under New Jersey’s common-law doctrine 
of necessaries. In Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hospital 
v. Estate of Baum, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that 
“both spouses are liable for necessary expenses incurred by 
either spouse in the course of the marriage.” 417 A.2d 1003, 
1005 (N.J. 1980). Additionally, a non-debtor is liable for the 
debts of her spouse only if “the assets of the spouse who 
incurred the debt are insufficient.” Id. at 1010. CSW’s argu-
ments prevailed in the District Court.  
 
Klotz argues the following on appeal: (1) federal law 
preempts the doctrine of necessaries, and thus CSW’s collec-
tion effort violated the FDCPA; (2) CSW failed to follow the 
doctrine’s procedural requirement that CSW seek repayment 
from her husband before seeking repayment from her; and (3) 
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First, Klotz argues that the ECOA preempts the doctrine 
of necessaries. Federal law1 can preempt state law in three 
ways: (1) express preemption; (2) field preemption; or (3) con-
flict preemption. Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 115 (3d 
Cir. 2010). Conflict preemption, the only type of preemption 
relevant here, “exists where compliance with both state and 
federal law is impossible, or where the state law stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress.” Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 
575 U.S. 373, 377 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100–01 
(1989)). 
 
 Two principles guide a conflict-preemption analysis. 
First, “all preemption arguments[] must be grounded in the text 
and structure of the [federal] statute at issue.” Kansas v. 
Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 804 (2020) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 
658, 664 (1993)). Second, “there is a strong presumption 
against preemption in areas of the law that States have tradi-
tionally occupied.” Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 
F.3d 680, 687 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). 
 
 
1 Federal regulations can also have preemptive effect. See 




 The ECOA prohibits “any creditor” from “discrimi-
nat[ing] against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a 
credit transaction[] on the basis of . . . marital status.” 
15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1). As relevant here, one regulation 
implementing the ECOA provides that “a creditor shall not 
require the signature of an applicant’s spouse . . . on any credit 
instrument if the applicant qualifies under the creditor’s stand-
ards of creditworthiness for the amount and terms of the credit 
requested.” 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1) (2021).  
 
Klotz argues that the doctrine of necessaries conflicts 
with the spousal-signature prohibition found at 
12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1).2 By imposing liability for her 
deceased husband’s debt, Klotz argues, the doctrine effectively 
treats her as a spousal co-signer on the debt in violation of the 
spousal-signature prohibition. This conflict means the spousal-
signature prohibition preempts the doctrine. 
 
Putting aside questions such as whether CSW is a “cred-
itor” and Klotz an “applicant” under the spousal-signature pro-
hibition, we hold that the ECOA does not preempt the doctrine 
of necessaries because the debt is “incidental credit” exempt 
from the prohibition. The Federal Reserve Board may exempt 
certain categories of transactions from the scope of the ECOA 
“after making an express finding that the application of . . . any 
 
2 We cite to the Federal Reserve Board’s regulations but note 
for completeness that much of the rulemaking authority under 
the ECOA was transferred to the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) in 2011. The CFPB restated the 
Federal Reserve’s regulations at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 79,442 (Dec. 21, 2011); see also Tyson v. Sterling Rental, 
Inc., 836 F.3d 571, 578 (6th Cir. 2016).   
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provision . . . would not contribute substantially to effecting 
the purposes of [the ECOA].” 15 U.S.C. § 1691b(b). The 
agency exercised this authority by exempting “incidental 
credit” from the § 202.7(d) spousal-signature prohibition. See 
12 C.F.R. § 202.3(c)(2)(v) (2021); Equal Credit Opportunity, 
68 Fed. Reg. 13,144, 13,145 (March 18, 2003) (to be codified 
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 202). “Incidental credit refers to extensions of 
consumer credit . . . (i) [t]hat are not made pursuant to the terms 
of a credit card account; (ii) [t]hat are not subject to a finance 
charge . . . and (iii) [t]hat are not payable by agreement in more 
than four installments.” Id. § 202.3(c)(1).  
 
 Klotz’s medical debt qualifies as incidental credit 
because it satisfies all three criteria. She does not dispute that 
the debt is not related to a credit card account, not subject to a 
finance charge, and not subject to installment payments. See 
Equal Credit Opportunity, 68 Fed. Reg. at 13,188 (listing med-
ical debt from a hospital or doctor that “allows the client or 
customer to defer the payment of a bill” as an example of inci-
dental credit); Mays v. Buckeye Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 277 
F.3d 873, 877–79 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that money owed to 
an electrical utility was incidental credit under 
12 C.F.R. § 202.3(c) because the utility “ha[d] no credit card 
accounts, d[id] not permit installment payments for electrical 
service, and d[id] not impose finance charges”). Because the 
medical debt CSW sought to collect is incidental credit exempt 
from the spousal-signature prohibition, CSW’s attempt to col-
lect the debt cannot violate the prohibition. 
 
Given that the spousal-signature prohibition does not 
apply, we hold the ECOA and its regulations do not conflict-
preempt the doctrine of necessaries. To succeed on a conflict-
preemption argument, Klotz must demonstrate that the doc-
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trine of necessaries either (1) makes compliance with the 
ECOA impossible or (2) “stand[s] as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes” of the ECOA. 
Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 806 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The identification of the purpose “cannot be based on a free-
wheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in ten-
sion with federal objectives.” Id. at 801 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  
  
CSW’s use of the doctrine of necessaries complies with 
the ECOA because the medical debt is incidental credit exempt 
from the spousal-signature prohibition. Further, Klotz’s 
attempt to invoke the general objectives of the ECOA fails, as 
the statute was focused on ensuring the availability of credit 
rather than the allocation of liability between spouses.  See 
Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., LLC, 476 
F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is apparent that what the 
Act was intended to do was to forbid a creditor to deny credit 
to a [married] woman on the basis of a belief that she would 
not be a good credit risk.”). Because CSW’s use of the doctrine 
of necessaries complies with the ECOA and does not frustrate 
the purpose of the ECOA, we hold the ECOA has not 




Klotz next argues that CSW failed to comply with the 
requirements of the doctrine of necessaries. But she did not 
plead adequate facts to support her argument, and her husband 
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does not have an estate that could pay the debt, so the argument 
fails.  
 
 Before resorting to the doctrine of necessaries, a credi-
tor must “first seek satisfaction from the income and other 
property of the spouse who incurred the debt.” Jersey Shore, 
417 A.2d at 1005. This step ensures that the doctrine applies 
“only where the financial resources of the spouse who incurred 
the necessary expense are insufficient.” Id. at 1010. Klotz’s 
complaint does not allege that CSW flouted the doctrine’s 
requirement that it first seek satisfaction from her deceased 
husband. Nor does the complaint allege that her husband’s 
estate possessed funds to cover the debt. Public records—
which we may consider when reviewing the grant of a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, see Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d 
Cir. 2010)—explain this omission: they show that Klotz’s hus-
band does not have an estate. 
 
Klotz argues that CSW should have sought administra-
tion of her husband’s estate under N.J. Rev. Stat. § 3B:10-2 
(explaining who can seek administration of an estate). Jersey 
Shore forecloses this argument. There, the “defendant’s late 
husband[] died at the hospital after a long illness which 
exhausted his medicaid benefits and left a balance due the hos-
pital of $25,709.50.” Jersey Shore, 417 A.2d at 1004. “[The 
husband’s] estate was insolvent, and no one [had] sought let-
ters of administration.” Id. Yet the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey permitted the creditor hospital to assert a doctrine-of-
necessaries argument against the surviving wife. See id. at 
1006–07. Klotz fails to explain what other action CSW should 






Third, Klotz argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion by denying her motion for leave to file an amended 
complaint. The District Court denied Klotz’s motion because 
the amendment would be futile. We agree. 
 
A proposed amendment to a complaint is futile if the 
complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. See Suzuki, 227 F.3d at 121. Klotz 
argues that her proposed amended complaint would not be 
futile because it would plead that CSW’s letters sought to col-
lect an amount beyond what the doctrine of necessaries per-
mits. CSW’s letters sought to collect a debt of $1,580. Klotz 
pleads that her husband was a Medicare beneficiary with a 
Medicare deductible of $1,316, thus implying that some 
amount of the debt in the collection letter was not covered by 
Medicare. She also pleads that the collection amount “included 
copayments, expenses, fees, costs and/or other charges 
incurred on additional dates beyond the ‘Date of Service’ spec-
ified in the [collection letters].” App. at 123. 
  
 Even if the debt included a small amount of ancillary 
charges beyond the Medicare deductible of Klotz’s husband, 
these allegations do not change whether the debt resulted from 
the provision of a necessary service. Indeed, necessaries can be 
costs that “directly or indirectly are designed to preserve the 
assets of [a] marriage or to permit [a debtor spouse] to continue 
his normal life, including the ability to make income and sup-
port the family either through employment or providing ser-
vices or emotional well-being in the household.” See DuBois 
v. DeLarm, 578 A.2d 1250, 1255 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1990) (emphasis added). None of Klotz’s proposed allegations 
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challenge whether the debt incurred falls outside the definition 
of a necessary under New Jersey law. Her “complaint pleads 
facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ [CSW]’s liability” but 
“stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 
entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The District Court did not abuse its discretion 
when it denied Klotz’s request for leave to amend for futility.  
 
* * * 
The ECOA does not preempt New Jersey’s doctrine of 
necessaries, so the doctrine permitted CSW to send its collec-
tion letters to Klotz without violating the FDCPA. Addition-
ally, CSW followed the procedural requirements of the doc-
trine, and Klotz’s filing an amended complaint would be futile. 
So we will affirm the District Court’s judgment dismissing 
Klotz’s complaint. 
